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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2650 
___________ 
 
RICHARD POTTS, 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RONNIE HOLT; WAYNE RYAN;  
A.F.S.A. DESHAWN CHINA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-01441) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 24, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Richard Potts appeals pro se from the District Court’s order entering summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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for further proceedings. 
I. 
 In reciting the factual background of this case, we accept as true the factual 
allegations in Potts’s amended complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from the 
record in his favor.  Potts is a federal prisoner who was incarcerated at the United States 
Penitentiary, Canaan (“USP-Canaan”) but who has since been transferred.  Potts also is a 
practicing Muslim and has participated in the Bureau of Prisons’ certified religious meal 
program for over ten years.  On June 26, 2011, USP-Canaan was placed on lockdown for 
approximately two weeks when numerous inmates became ill after eating meals 
contaminated with salmonella.  During that time, prison officials relocated food 
preparation to an adjacent facility, approved modified diets, and suspended the certified 
religious meals program. 
 Potts filed suit pro se under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the defendant prison officials1 violated the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and his First and Eighth Amendment 
rights.  In his amended complaint and a subsequent sworn declaration, Potts alleged that 
defendants unnecessarily suspended the certified religious meal program without notice 
on June 27, 2011, did not resume it until July 13, 2011, and denied him thirty-six or more 
                                              
1 Because the alleged conduct of particular defendants is not relevant to our disposition of 
this appeal, we refer to them collectively as “defendants” without suggesting that any 
particular defendant was responsible for any of the particular conduct discussed herein. 
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certified meals during that time.  He further alleged that none of the certified meal 
program participants had fallen ill because the certified meals were not tainted by 
salmonella and that defendants should have known that fact when suspending the 
program, or at least by July 1 when they had an exact count of the inmates who had fallen 
ill and when they approved a modified menu.2  Thus, he asserted, defendants violated his 
rights by suspending the program in the first place and by not reinstating it sooner than 
they did.  Finally, Potts alleged that the alternative meals defendants provided during the 
lockdown were not religiously acceptable, that no one notified him that the certified 
meals program had been suspended, and that he thus ate “very little and most of the time 
nothing” for two weeks out of fear of being removed from the certified meal program for 
failing to comply with it.  Potts requested both monetary damages and an injunction 
requiring defendants to serve certified religious meals during lockdowns in the future. 
 Defendants filed a pre-discovery motion to dismiss Potts’s amended complaint or 
for summary judgment, and a Magistrate Judge recommended granting it on various 
grounds, including qualified immunity.  The District Court sustained several of Potts’s 
objections, but it ultimately agreed that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and 
entered summary judgment solely on that basis.  Potts appeals pro se.3 
                                              
2 In other filings, Potts suggested that defendants could have resumed the certified meals 
program on July 7, when food preparations at USP-Canaan resumed, or July 9, when 
USP-Canaan reinstated the pre-lockdown menu. 
 
3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review of the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment and the legal issues underpinning a claim of 
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II. 
 We apply “a two-part analysis” to claims of qualified immunity and ask “(1) 
whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional or federal right; and (2) whether 
the right at issue was clearly established.”  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quotation marks omitted).  The District Court concluded that whether defendants 
violated Potts’s rights under the First Amendment and RFRA was materially in dispute 
but that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because those rights were not 
clearly established.  Although defendants have not challenged the District Court’s ruling 
that Potts adequately showed a violation of his rights at this stage, our consideration of 
whether those rights were clearly established will benefit from some preliminary 
discussion of our agreement on that point. 
 Potts alleges that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment and 
RFRA by suspending the certified religious meals program for two weeks without 
sufficient justification.  We have long held that prisoners generally are entitled to 
religiously acceptable meals while in prison.  See Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 192 
                                                                                                                                                  
qualified immunity.”  Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).  In doing so, 
we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that 
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences” therefrom.  Id.  Defendants bear the burden 
of establishing qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.  See id. at 288.  The 
parties dispute whether the defense of qualified immunity applies to RFRA claims, which 
we have not decided, but we need not address that issue because we conclude that 
defendants have not shown entitlement to qualified immunity on Potts’s RFRA claim.  
We also do not address Potts’s Eighth Amendment claim because he has not challenged 
the District Court’s entry of judgment on that claim, but we note that we would affirm as 
to that claim for the reasons explained by the District Court. 
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(3d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003); DeHart v. Horn, 
227 F.3d 47, 52, 59 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  Thus, Potts’s First Amendment claim 
turns on whether defendants’ suspension of the certified religious meals program during 
the salmonella outbreak and resultant lockdown was reasonable under the four factors set 
forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  See Williams, 343 F.3d at 216-17; DeHart, 
227 F.3d at 50-51, 59 & n.8.4  Potts’s RFRA claim turns on whether defendants’ 
suspension of the certified meals program was (1) the “least restrictive means” of (2) 
furthering “a compelling governmental interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).   
 The District Court determined that defendants had not adduced evidence sufficient 
to show that their suspension of the certified meals program was reasonable under Turner 
or that it satisfied the RFRA standard.  We agree with these determinations because, inter 
alia, defendants did not establish the nature or even the existence of any nexus between 
the salmonella outbreak/lockdown and their suspension of certified religious meals.5 
                                              
4 The Turner factors are:  (1) whether there is “a valid, rational connection between the 
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) 
“whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison 
inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on 
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) 
whether there is an “absence of ready alternatives” to the regulation.  Williams, 343 F.3d 
at 217 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90). 
 
5 Defendants relied on Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 4700.05, which provides 
that an “alternate menu” may be offered “[i]n emergency situations such as an institution 
lockdown.”  (ECF No. 43-1 at 59.)  Defendants, however, presented no evidence or 
argument showing how (or even that) this particular emergency required suspension of 
the certified meals program.  Defendants also presented no evidence or argument on 
whether it was possible to provide certified religious meals during some or all of that 
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 The District Court concluded, however, that Potts’s rights were not clearly 
established at the time of defendants’ alleged conduct.  “In determining whether a right 
has been clearly established, the court must define the right allegedly violated at the 
appropriate level of specificity.”  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159.  The District Court defined the 
right at issue in this case as the right to “religious meals during a prison-wide lockdown 
that resulted after an outbreak of food poisoning (or disease generally) in the inmate 
population.”  (ECF No. 54 at 23.)  The District Court further concluded that such a right 
was not clearly established because there is no case law addressing an inmate’s right to 
religious meals in a similar factual scenario. 
 There does indeed appear to be a dearth of such case law.  Cf. Eason v. Thaler, 14 
F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding only that a similar claim was not frivolous for 
purposes of the in forma pauperis statute).  “Even though there may be no previous 
precedent directly on point,” however, “an action can still violate a clearly established 
                                                                                                                                                  
time, how burdensome it would have been to do so, or whether they even considered that 
possibility.  Nor have they provided any evidence regarding operation of the certified 
meals program itself, such as whether the certified meals served at USP-Canaan are 
prepared at USP-Canaan or whether, as Potts asserted in one of his briefs, USP-Canaan 
receives them prepackaged from an outside vendor.  Defendants also presented no 
evidence or argument rebutting Potts’s allegations that they could have resumed the 
certified meals program sooner than they did and need not have suspended it at all.  To 
the contrary, as the District Court concluded, “the evidence in the record when viewed in 
the light most favorable to Potts suggests that religious diet meals could have been 
prepared during the lockdown.”  (ECF No. 54 at 15.)  In sum, none of defendants’ 
evidence explains why they withheld thirty-six or more certified meals from Potts over a 
period of two weeks.  See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We can 
only give deference to the positions of prison officials . . . when the officials have set 
forth those positions and entered them into the record.”). 
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right where a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law applies 
with obvious clarity.”  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159.   
 Such is the case here.  At the time of defendants’ alleged conduct, it was clearly  
established in this Circuit that prisoners’ general right to freely exercise their religion 
gives them the more specific right to be served religiously acceptable meals while in  
prison.  See, e.g., Williams, 455 F.3d at 192.  It also had long been established that prison 
officials may constitutionally infringe that specific First Amendment right when prison 
administration so requires, but only when the infringement is reasonable under the Turner 
factors.  See Williams, 343 F.3d at 216-17; DeHart, 227 F.3d at 50-51, 59 & n.8.  And 
RFRA clearly establishes that defendants may not substantially burden an inmate’s 
exercise of religion without satisfying the standard set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).   
 Thus, at the time of defendants’ alleged conduct, it was clearly established both 
that Potts had a right to religiously acceptable meals and that defendants could not 
infringe on that right without sufficient justification under Turner and RFRA.  See Wall 
v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2014); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198-99 
(4th Cir. 2006); Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003).  In light of our 
precedent addressing prisoners’ religious diets, no reasonable prison official could have 
believed that he or she could simply withhold Potts’s religious meals for two weeks in the 
absence of some justification.  And in light of Turner and RFRA, no reasonable prison 
official could have believed that the salmonella outbreak and lockdown provided such 
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justification in the absence of some nexus between the outbreak/lockdown and 
defendants’ ability to provide religious meals, which the current record does not reveal. 
 The District Court’s definition of the right in question does not account for Turner 
and RFRA, which already anticipate that prison officials are called upon to act in a 
variety of factual scenarios and that the lawfulness of their actions will be judged in the 
context of those specific scenarios.  See, e.g., DeHart, 227 F.3d at 59 n.8 (collecting cases 
addressing religious diets and noting that Turner requires “a contextual, record-sensitive 
analysis”).  The District Court’s application of its definition also runs afoul of the 
summary judgment standard because it effectively inferred in defendants’ favor the 
existence of a nexus between the outbreak/lockdown and defendants’ suspension of 
religious meals that the record does not reveal.  Cf. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 
1866 (2014) (per curiam) (“[C]ourts must take care not to define a case’s ‘context’ [in 
defining a right for qualified immunity purposes] in a manner that imports genuinely 
disputed factual propositions.”).  We have no doubt that the outbreak and lockdown 
posed significant challenges, and a more developed record might ultimately reveal that 
those challenges warranted a two-week suspension of the certified religious meals 
program.  The mere fact that defendants acted against that backdrop, however, is not 
dispositive for qualified immunity purposes. 
 The District Court relied on one other factor in concluding that Potts’s right to 
religiously acceptable meals was not clearly established in this context.  The District 
Court wrote that it reached its conclusion “especially in view of the fact that inmates 
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were provided with nutritionally adequate meals containing non-meat, religiously 
acceptable food choices.”  (ECF No. 54 at 25.)  The District Court did not cite any record 
support for that conclusion, defendants cite no such support on appeal, and this point 
appears to be disputed.   
 Potts alleged in his amended complaint that the meals offered to him during the 
lockdown “were cooked in animal bases that were unKosher/Halaal.”  (ECF No. 36 at 4.)   
The only evidence in defendants’ submissions that they may have offered him religiously 
acceptable alternatives appears to be an e-mail dated July 8, 2011, from defendant 
DeShawn China to the Food Service Department.  That e-mail reads in relevant part:  
“Also, remember to prepare no flesh alternatives as well.  My suggestion is to utilize the 
Religious Diet Meals (Vegan) to accomplish this.”  (ECF No. 43-1 at 16.)  Even drawing 
the inference against Potts that defendants actually began offering these meals to him on 
July 8 (which we will not do at this stage), China did not send this e-mail until twelve 
days into the lockdown.  This e-mail thus does not account for Potts’s allegations (which 
defendants thus far have not disputed) that defendants could have resumed serving 
certified religious meals at least by July 1 and need not have suspended the certified meal  
program at all.6 
                                              
6 Potts also expressly asserts in his brief in opposition to defendants’ motion that all of 
the food he was offered during the lockdown was non-kosher/halaal and that defendants 
never offered him a “no-flesh” meal.  (ECF No. 47 at 7.)  These allegations are neither 
sworn nor contained in a pleading, but the District Court did not discredit them for those 
reasons or otherwise address them. 
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 In sum, the District Court erred in concluding on this record that defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity on Potts’s First Amendment and RFRA claims.  We 
express no opinion on the merits of those claims or on whether, at some later stage, 
defendants might show that they are entitled to qualified immunity.  We also express no 
opinion on the arguments in defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment that 
the District Court did not reach and that defendants have not raised on appeal.  Finally, 
we express no opinion on Potts’s claim for injunctive relief, which the District Court did 
not address.7 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court as to 
Potts’s Eighth Amendment claim, vacate it as to his claims under the First Amendment 
and RFRA, and remand for further proceedings 
                                              
7 Qualified immunity provides a defense to claims for monetary damages but not for 
injunctive relief.  See Montanez v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 488 (3d Cir. 
2014).  It appears that Potts’s claim for injunctive relief may have become moot because 
he has been transferred to a different facility, see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 222 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2000), but the District Court can address that issue as appropriate on remand.   
